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Chapter VII

REINTERPRETATION OF THE TRADITIONAL HERITAGE

A. ŚAṄKAR RĀMACANDRA RĀJWĀDE : THE LAW OF POLARITY

AT THE TURN of the century a variety of opinions were expressed in lectures, periodicals and books. In one way or other the discussions in the field of philosophy were focused on the relation between new and traditional ideas. Tradition, it was said, was not to be despised; neither was it to be accepted uncritically. It was in need of being reinterpreted, or at least restated.

The thinkers to be mentioned in this chapter occupied themselves with this task. They did not wish to supplant or cast away traditional ideas. They felt that the solution to many of their problems were contained, at least in embryo, among the treasures of thought preserved in the vast storehouse of tradition. All these thinkers were born in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and lived through their most formative years shortly after the turn of the century. Their period of greatest productivity fell between the two World Wars. They do not, strictly speaking, form a common group, or school of thought.

An exposition of the thought of Śaṅkar Rāmacandra Rājwāde begins this chapter. His literary works approach the category of strictly philosophical works. Not many books of this type exist in the Marāṭhī language today.

Rājwāde was born on October 23, 1879 in Puṇe of a Konkanaṣṭha Brāhmaṇ family.¹ During his high school years, A.

¹ The biographical references are from S. R. Rājwāde's autobiography *Mī āṇi Mājhe Kārya* which is as yet unpublished. The manuscript is preserved at the *Sanātana Vaidika Dharma Kāryālaya*, Sadashiv Peth, Puṇe 411030. It consists of 21 copy-books and some loose sheets. The copy-books have the numbers I-III (blue covers) and III-XVI (ordinary brown covers).

Berguin's Children's Friend and Croxall's Aesop's Fables were still on the list of prescribed books.² Soon he became an ardent devotee of V. K. Ciplūṅkar, whose Nibandhamālā he read several times.³ It engendered in him a disrespect for persons like Lokahitavādī, Dayānanda Sarasvatī, M. G. Rāṇaḍe, and M. M. Kuṅṭe.⁴ He admired the writings of M. S. Goḷe.⁵ Through Ciplūṅkar he was favourably disposed towards B. G. Ṭīlak and the other founder-members of the Deccan Education Society.

In 1897 Rājwāde joined the Deccan College in Pune. He was deeply interested in literature, philosophy, drama, and in social and political activities, sometimes at the expense of the prescribed studies. His college years coincided with the period when an attack of plague raged in Pune. Owing to the death of his father he had to interrupt his studies between 1902 and 1907, and went into Government service.

He returned to his studies, first at the Fergusson College, Pune, and then once more at the Deccan College. He succeeded in passing the B. A. examination, then studied law for a year, but was soon drawn back into public activities.

Rājwāde was an impressive orator, and delivered lectures throughout his life, both in and outside of Mahārāṣṭra. For two and a half months every year he used to give lectures at Pune in a series called *Jñānasatra*. At the *Sanātana Vaidika Dharma Kāryālaya* in Pune, he maintained the *agnihotra*, the perpetual, sacred fire. On that account, he became known as *Āhitāgni Rājwāde*. *Āhitāgni* means 'he who maintains a sacred fire'.

No. IV extends over three copy-books, i. e., Nos. IV, IV (1) and IV (2). One copy-book is without a number. We do not, however, follow this enumeration, but an earlier one marked in red which divides the matter into XXIII parts. Part VI is missing, but it may be possible for a future editor to supplement it from the information contained in the loose sheets.

² Cf. *ibid.*, I, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, I, p. 25.

⁴ M. M. Kuṅṭe, 1835-1888, was a famous educationalist, historian, and a reformer who wrote with competence on the main schools of Indian philosophy. In later years Rājwāde's respect for Ciplūṅkar decreased as his respect for Kuṅṭe increased. Cf. *ibid.*, I, p. 28.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, p. 31.

Āhitāgni Rājwāḍe's activities ranged over the fields of religion, education, culture and literature.⁶ Rājwāḍe wrote voluminously.⁷ In his vast sweep through philosophical systems, different religions, and the natural sciences, he displays an extraordinary wealth of learning. In his presentation it is more often the orator than the meticulous scholar that comes to the foreground. Rājwāḍe died in 1952.

The Influence of Professor F. W. Bain

A mind as alert as Rājwāḍe's could not but be marked by the social, political, and intellectual trends which characterized the turn of the century. The deepest and most lasting influence in the formation of Rājwāḍe's mind came, however, from his 'revered guru',⁸ F. W. Bain, who was professor and then principal of the Deccan College. It was a time when a handful of devoted professors could shape the outlook of a whole generation. Bain's fairness, his competence, and outspokenness captivated

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, p. 2.

⁷ One year after the publication of Ṭīḷak's *Gītārahasya*, Rājwāḍe published his *Gītābhāṣya athavā Nītiśāstra va Samājaśāstradīṣṭyā Gītārthavivarāṇa*, Puṇe, 1916. The book discusses the first three chapters of the *Bhagavad Gītā*. (Rājwāḍe had finished the manuscript on all the chapters of the *Bhagavad Gītā* before the publication of the *Gītārahasya*.) The next publication was *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, Vol I, Puṇe, 1927, followed by *Nietzschecā Khrīstāntaka āṇi Khrīstāntaka Nietzsche*, Puṇe, 1931, which is a Marāṭhī translation of Nietzsche's *Der Antichrist* together with a commentary and observations on Nietzsche's life and ideology. The remaining published philosophical works of Rājwāḍe are *Vaidikadharmā āṇi Saḍdarśane athavā Cāra Vidyā va Sahā Śāstre* (Ravbāhādur Baburāv Dādā Kinkheḍe Lectures, University of Nāgpūr, 1938), Puṇe, 1940; *Sanātana Vaidika Dharmapravacana Mālā*, Vol. 1, Puṇe, 1947; *Saḍdarśanasamanvaya āṇi Puruṣārthamīmāṃsā*, Puṇe, 1949; *Iṣāvāsyopaniṣadbhāṣya*, Puṇe, 1949. *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, Part II, Carama Khaṇḍa [Part II, Vol. 3], Puṇe, 1949. Besides these philosophical works Rājwāḍe published two extensive volumes on Sexology, which are Part II, Vol. 1 and Vol. 2 of the *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*. Amongst his unpublished works are *Gītābhāṣya* (chapters IV-XVIII); *A History of Indian Astrology*, one volume; *The History of the Pārsī Religion*, one volume; a third volume on Sexology; *Mī āṇi Mājhe Kārya* (his Auto-biography); and a large number of lecture notes, including Rājwāḍe's notes on the lectures of F. W. Bain.

⁸ Rājwāḍe, *Mī āṇi Mājhe Kārya*, XIX, p. 570.

the students. He has several scholarly and literary works to his credit. He combines patriotism with a great love of Aristotle. He wrote :

‘ Aristotle is the great constitutional philosopher and natural historian, who has, as it were, critically anticipated the English type : the spirit of his philosophy is incarnate in their practical activity. For what is the Englishman’s *summum bonum* ? It is, I will venture to answer for him, the exercise of power, i. e., the realisation of the possible.’⁹

Bain, whom Rājwāḍe called a hater of the Christian religion, nevertheless had the highest respect for the Jesuits, who in his view ‘ pin their faith to the philosopher [Aristotle] who saw all the sides of the moral question...’¹⁰ Aristotle was for him ‘ the discoverer’, the ‘ greatest master’ of evolution, which in modern times was associated mainly with von Baer and Herbert Spencer.¹¹ Bain was a realist. For him it was ‘ just the essence of the phenomena that they are’.¹²

According to Aristotle all multiple and variable beings are composed of two principles : a principle of perfection, called actuality, and a principle of imperfection, called potentiality. We hear an echo of these constituent principles of every finite being when Bain writes, ‘ All things are in intricate correlation, in action and counter-action, everything is at once active and passive.’¹³

Far from admitting that action follows being (*agere sequitur esse*), Bain wrote that action constitutes being (*agere constituit esse*).¹⁴ Being follows acting. (*Esse sequitur operari.*)¹⁵ From this Bain concluded :

‘ Function makes structure, and work is the soul of the world. Instead of *cogito ergo sum*, the superficial epigram of an

⁹ F. W. Bain, *On the Realisation of the Possible and the Spirit of Aristotle*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰ F. W. Bain, *Body and Soul or the Method of Economy*, p. 139.

¹¹ Bain, *On the Realisation of the Possible and the Spirit of Aristotle*, pp. 250-51.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹³ Bain, *Body and Soul or the Method of Economy*, p. 33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

ignorant dreamer, Darwin and Aristotle proclaim aloud the secret of everything in Nature to be *sum quia ago*; I work, therefore I am. I live to work.¹⁶

‘Political economy, regarded as the Science of the Production and Distribution of Wealth,’ was for Bain, ‘a special case of the universal law.’¹⁷

Bain looked at the concrete complexity of things with what he called the analytic or organic method. He argued analytically backwards, contemplating every fact in its own peculiar constituent relations, and thus he believed himself to have discovered the universal law that function makes structure.¹⁸

Bain disagreed with many generally accepted philosophical ideas of his time. J. S. Mill was for him, as Rājwāḍe remembers in his Autobiography, ‘one of the quintessential nineteenth century, hopeless idiots’.¹⁹ He was against the ‘old orthodox liberal political economists’, i. e., A. Smith, D. Ricardo, and J. S. Mill,²⁰ of whose liberalism Marxism was ‘a necessary corollary’.²¹ Bain detested the very name of Herbert Spencer.²² Auguste Comte was for him ‘a bombastic windbag’.²³ He disagreed with J. S. Mill’s work, *The Subjection of Women*. For him women should be free *under* [Italics are ours.] men; they were not in need of the same education as men.²⁴ Distinctions between low and high in society should be preserved.²⁵

Bain became Rājwāḍe’s idol. ‘In Bain’s lectures I found this foreign Professor completely inclined towards our traditional religion, while I saw our own reform leaders hasten eagerly towards modern ideas and foreign Christian ways of behaviour.’²⁶ It was through Bain’s lectures that Rājwāḍe began to pity the

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. x.

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 460 (Appendix III).

¹⁹ Rājwāḍe, *Mī āṇi Mājhe Kārya*, XIX, p. 551, 3.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, XVIII, pp. 529-30.

²¹ *Ibid.*, XVIII, p. 523.

²² *Ibid.*, XVIII, p. 528.

²³ *Ibid.*, XVIII, p. 540.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, XIX, p. 551, 3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, XVIII, p. 529.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, XIX, p. 562.

British idols of Āgarkar's reform,²⁷ and with them the reformers whom he saw typified in R. P. Parānjpye, then principal of the Fergusson College in Pune. They stood for a change which, in Rājwāde's view, endangered the traditional order of society. He reports R. P. Parānjpye as having said, 'Show me your God, and I shall kick him out.'²⁸

Rājwāde was opposed to the new order of society as delineated by Āgarkar. He found new inspiration in the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, whose name he met for the first time in B. G. Ṭīlak's *Gītārahasya*.²⁹ Bain had prepared him for Nietzsche, although he never mentioned Nietzsche by name in any of his lectures. From this Rājwāde concludes that, when he studied under him, Bain was unacquainted with the philosophy of Nietzsche.³⁰ Like Nietzsche, Bain favoured Aristotle against Socrates and Plato; he hated the Christian religion and opposed Buddhism, but had a high respect for Manu. Both have expressed the same opinions about Locke, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Mill, Carlyle, and Spencer.³¹

The Concept of Polarity

Besides his influence on Rājwāde's general outlook, Bain also provided the key to his later philosophy, i. e., the concept of polarity, expressed by the word *dvandva*.³² Rājwāde was inspired to write his *Gītābhāṣya* after reading Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, which indicates at least his general preoccupation with Aristotle.³³ That the word *dvandva* was ultimately inspired by Aristotle may be concluded from its use in the series

²⁷ *Ibid.*, I, p. 34.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, XIX, pp. 563-64.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, XVIII, p. 527.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, XVIII, p. 527. Rājwāde had in his library *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, Vol. I-XVIII, edited by Oscar Levy, London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1907-1913. Pencil marks in the books show that they were read with some animation.

³¹ Rājwāde, *Mī āṇi Mājhe Kārya*, XVIII, 527-28, *passim*.

³² *Dvandva* is the repeated nominative case of *dva* and means a pair, a couple, a pair of opposites.

³³ Rājwāde, *Gītābhāṣya athavā Nītiśāstra va Samājaśāstradṛṣṭyā Gītārthavivarāṇa*, p. 9.

of lectures entitled *Vaidikadharmā Ṣaddarśane athavā Cāra Vidyā va Sahā Śāstre*. Shortly after the first introduction of the term, the words potentiality and actuality occur.³⁴

In Rājwāḍe's view the philosophy of the Vedas is 'beyond opposite' (*dvandvātīta*), and the peculiarity of the Bhagavad Gītā is expressed in the word *nirdvandva* (without opposites). The essential content (*sārasarvasva*) of the Bhagavad Gītā is expressed in this word. In the place of *nirdvandva*, Śāṅkarācārya substituted the word *advaita*, and thus destroyed the meaning of the Vedas and of the Bhagavad Gītā. Rājwāḍe regarded this insight as the great discovery of his life.³⁵

Rājwāḍe rejects feeling or special intuition as the basis of his philosophy. He said :

‘ I am a rationalist. I have nothing to do either with the four-armed God of the devotee or with the ineffable happiness of the *vogī's* contemplation ! I have to understand the mystery of nature and the Vedas with the help of reason ! Not through feeling.’³⁶

This ‘rationalism’ was not simply the West-inspired rationalism of the reformers of his time. He wished to combine modern science with the old faith, the new rational outlook of the modern tradition with the old morality of ancient tradition.³⁷ He made an effort to establish his rationalism by commenting on authoritative religious texts, to illustrate and confirm them through the findings of modern sciences. In his *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, Part I, he endeavoured to establish the idea of polarity by commenting on Ṛg-Veda 10, 129, the deepest of the cosmogonic hymns of the Ṛg-Veda. In it the unknown poet struggles with the problem of the origin of the real world out of nothing.

³⁴ Rājwāḍe, *Vaidikadharmā āṇi Ṣaddarśane athavā Cāra Vidyā va Sahā Śāstre*, p. 23.

³⁵ Cf. Rājwāḍe, *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, Part I, pp. 7-8.

³⁶ S. K. Kṣīrsāgar, ‘ Āhitāgni Rājwāḍe Yāncī Jñānasādhana ’, *Loksattā*, October 29, 1951, p. 13.

³⁷ Madhusūdan Phaḍke, ‘ Mahārāṣṭrace Mīmāṃsaka Tattvajñāni Āhitāgni Rājwāḍe ’, *Manohar*, XIX, No. 224 (November, 1952), 15, 16.

Rājwāḍe sees in it the first statement about the existence of a being beyond opposites and about the origin of opposites.³⁸ He praises it for explaining the origin of being from non-being, the many from the one, the determined from the undetermined. He writes using words referring to procreation, 'In the beginning there was desire (kāma) which was the first seed (reta) of mind (of Paramātmā)'.³⁹ In Rājwāḍe's commentary, Einstein's law of relativity is brought in to illustrate his findings.⁴⁰ But Rājwāḍe lacked a philosophical methodology and a properly-founded rational foundation for his philosophy.

Rājwāḍe emphasized the existence of pairs of opposites, such as life and death, warm and cold, joy and pain. If one wishes to understand existing things fully, he argued, one has to admit a 'duality', one part of which postulates the other, and cannot be rejected when the other is accepted. The parts are not exclusive of each other, but supplement each other. To understand things as they are, one must admit relation of polarity, i. e., collateral and relative opposites. All existing beings can be comprehended within this scheme. Rājwāḍe wrote :

'The law of polarity is the only physical principle of the Universe, and it is on it that all the other divine, spiritual, and moral principles are based. If this is not understood, then the universe will not be understood; if the universe is not understood, then *Brahma* will not be understood, and if *Brahma* is not understood, how will it be possible to understand the soul (ātmā) ?'⁴¹

In Rājwāḍe's view, it is rational to accept this law of polarity. He writes that the Bhagavad Gītā combines polarity and unity, because the exposition of the book is rational.⁴²

The Evolutionary Absolute

The Absolute as seen by Rājwāḍe is in a process of evolution. It contains its fullness potentially from the beginning, but realises itself in a process of evolution.

³⁸ Rājwāḍe, *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, II, Vol. 3, p. 118.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, II, Vol. 3, p. 24.

⁴⁰ Cf. Rājwāḍe, *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, Part I, pp. 26, 31, 36.

⁴¹ Rājwāḍe, *Isāvāsyaopaniṣadbhāṣya*, p. 609.

⁴² Rājwāḍe, cf. *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, Part I, p. 192.

‘The fullness of the soul (ātmā) is in the form of seed; the fullness of *Brahma* is the fullness of the fruit. The soul contains in itself the foetus of the world (*jagat*) and the last stage of the world (Śikhara, peak, top) is the perfection of *Brahma*.’⁴³

In the different explanations of the origin of the universe, its evolutionary progress, and its final stage, Rājwāde does not fully overcome the mythological element contained in Ṛg-Veda 10.120.⁴⁴

Rājwāde clearly understood that the Absolute as conceived by him is not transcendent in relation to the world.⁴⁵ He knew of Aristotle’s concepts of potentiality and actuality, matter and form,⁴⁶ but he understood them differently. According to him, form is not the principle of actuality, nor is matter the principle of potentiality. He connects potentiality with the *puruṣa* of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, and actuality with its *prakṛti*. Since actuality cannot be left aside when the stage of full perfection is reached, *prakṛti*, becomes an integral part of the Absolute; thus we have, as Rājwāde himself says, pantheism.⁴⁷

Rājwāde explained his evolutionary Absolute with concepts borrowed from biology. This points to Nietzsche, whose doctrine of the eternal recurrence was inspired by the idea of the biological cycle of life and death.

Professor Bain used to refer to Hegel and other German idealists in his lectures. But there is no proof that these thinkers influenced Rājwāde in a decisive way; on the contrary he criticised them severely.

⁴³ Rājwāde, *Isāvāsyaopaniṣadbhāṣya*, p. 703. For a similar conception of an evolving universe inspired by biological concepts cf. *ibid.*, p. 704.

⁴⁴ Cf. K. F. Geldner, *Der Rig-Veda : Aus dem Sanscrit ins Deutsche übersetzt und mit einem laufenden Kommentar versehen*, III, pp. 359-361. Cf. Rājwāde, *Nāsadīyasūktabhāṣya*, pp. 276-77; *Isāvāsyaopaniṣadbhāṣya*, pp. 378, 691; *Saḍdarśanasamanvaya āṇi Puruṣārthamīmāṃsā*, pp. 90-91.

⁴⁵ Rājwāde, *Isāvāsyaopaniṣadbhāṣya*, pp. 4-5.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-15.

⁴⁷ Rājwāde, *Nāsadīyasūktabhāṣya*, p. 77.

Rājwāde was, however, drawn to Śrī Aurobindo Ghose, to whose periodical *Vande Mātaram* he subscribed, and whose writings, he confessed, he liked very much.⁴⁸ What has been said of Śrī Aurobindo applies equally well to Rājwāde :

‘ [He] was too much of a realist to be tempted to surrender the world-reality to the deceptive play of Māyā. But he was too much of a fidelist to dare give to the world in the face of the Upaniṣadic Oneness a reality of existence outside of, and distinct from, the Absolute... Śrī Aurobindo has fearlessly placed the Many and the Becoming in the very heart and substantiality of the Absolute Being... as an essential co-principle of the integral Absolute... The God of Aurobindo is... a Being that is in its essentiality an eternal Becoming.’⁴⁹ ‘ Brahman is in the essentiality of its universal being a unity and a multiplicity.’⁵⁰ ‘ The One Absolute of Aurobindo is potentially many, and therefore, can actually realise the many in time which is potentially contained in eternity.’⁵¹

Aurobindo and Rājwāde differ in their ideological approach. The keystone of Aurobindo’s philosophy is the concept of the Absolute as becoming.⁵² This Absolute can be realised through

⁴⁸ Rājwāde, *Mī āṇi Mājhe Kārya*, VIII, p. 96. Such a statement counts for much with a person as outspoken as Rājwāde, who showered criticism on many of his famous contemporaries. He wrote, e. g., that Mahārāṣṭra could learn nothing from Gāndhī, neither in political science, nor social science, nor philosophy (*Ibid.*, XV, p. 356). About V. D. Sāvarkar he wrote that with his arrival in the Hindu Mahāsabhā the little bit of religion which was in it disappeared completely (*Ibid.*, XVII, p. 485), and that the Hindu Mahāsabhā was just a counterpart to the Muslim League and as such agreeable to the British (*Ibid.*, XV, p. 338). He thought Vivekānanda an ordinary Bengālī graduate who was bewitched by Christian devotion and the Christian missions. (Cf. S. K. Kṣīrāsāgar, *loc. cit.*, p. 13.) Rājwāde had a high respect for Tīlāk as a politician, though he disagreed with his Vedāntic metaphysics. In spite of all his liking for the writings of Aurobindo Ghose, Rājwāde held that Aurobindo’s mysticism was nebulous.

⁴⁹ P. Colaco, S. J., ‘ Sri Aurobindo—A Philosophy of Reconciliation ’, *MSQJP*, XXVIII (1950-51), p. 297.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 298.

¹ Colaco, ‘ The Absolute of Creation in the Philosophy of Aurobindo ’, *ibid.*, XXIX (1951-52), p. 211.

⁵² Colaco, ‘ A Critical Estimate of Aurobindo, ’ *ibid.*, XXX (1952-53), p. 129.

yoga. Rājwāḍe explains being and becoming, the Absolute and the world through the concept of polar relations. This concept is at the centre of his speculations. He thinks thus to reach the true meaning of the sacred books, evident to human reason, and consonant with the findings of modern science.⁵³

In the Footsteps of Nietzsche

In his social philosophy and his ethics, Rājwāḍe is a follower of Nietzsche. Rājwāḍe wrote :

‘There is no place in Nietzsche’s philosophy for Christ’s one-sided duality nor for Kant’s one-sided monism [sic]. There is no place at all for Schopenhauer’s super-pessimistic *nirvāṇa* of pain, dangerous to life. On the contrary, there is the *brahmanirvāṇa* of the greatest joy which follows the principle of Oneness (*nirdvandva*) of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads.’⁵⁴

Rājwāḍe continues, that in this philosophy there is the will to happiness, the will to power and the will to suffer, with stress on the strength of the will, and not on the readiness to suffer. This philosophy produces the superman. It shows the greatest respect for the Manusmṛti in opposition to the Christian Bible, and for the regulated strength enshrined in the traditional institutions of caste and the stages of life in opposition to the unrestricted freedom of Christian democracy.⁵⁵

No wonder then that Rājwāḍe writes, that if a Hindu wishes to remain a Hindu, he must accept the caste system, touchabi-

⁵³ During a discussion one of the devotees of Aurobindo in Mahārāṣṭra—there are not too many of them in Mahārāṣṭra—spontaneously said, ‘Rājwāḍe is inferior to Aurobindo.’ One can agree with this statement. One of the reasons for this is the number of sweeping statements in Rājwāḍe’s writing. He gives, e. g., a broad classification of philosophy from *nirdvandva* to *nirvāṇa*, monism and dualism, and its reverse trend, pointing out as main representatives the Gītā, Buddha, Śāṅkara and Madhva on the one side, and Christ, Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the other. Rājwāḍe, *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, p. 236.

⁵⁴ Rājwāḍe, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamanvaya āṇi Puruṣārthamīmāṃsā*, p. 237.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 237-38. There is no doubt that Rājwāḍe fully understood the spirit of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Cf. H. von Glasenapp, *Das Indienbild Deutscher Denker*, pp. 102-109.

lity, and untouchability.⁵⁶ Woman is the property of man. This is so ordained by nature. It establishes the stability of nature, the happiness of man, woman, and of their progeny alike. It ensures the firmness of society.⁵⁷ The fact that a woman could become the President of the National Congress, as was the case with Dr. Annie Besant, was for him a sign of its decadence.⁵⁸

His admiration for Nietzsche led Rājwāḍe to admire Hitler. He wrote :

‘The Fascist hero of modern Germany, Mr. Hitler, understood the secret of the Āryan religion. During his reign he accepted the symbol (*pratīka*) of fire and the sign of the *swastika* for his flag. If by the disposition of God he had been victorious during the last World War, then the flag of the Āryan religion would be flying over the world today instead of that of the Christian religion, and in this country we would be witnessing the uplift of the Brāhman̄s instead of the uplift of the untouchables.’⁵⁹

Evaluation

Rājwāḍe attempted to synthesise his conviction of the reality of the world with the absolute oneness of the Absolute. But by including the becoming aspect in the intrinsic nature of the Absolute, he destroyed the absolute transcendency of God. Moreover, he was unable to show how the relative can be an essential co-principle of the intēgral one. His contact with Aristotle did not produce a new synthesis. In his effort to replace Śāṅkara’s monism—which in a way he regarded as a Buddhist victory over the Vedic religion⁶⁰—he sided with Nietzsche who opposed the Buddhistic negation of the will. Rājwāḍe recognised in Nietzsche’s thought a useful weapon in his stand against Christian ideas which he saw operating behind Western liberalism and

⁵⁶ Rājwāḍe, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamanvaya āṇi Puruṣārthamīmāṃsā*, pp. 420, 422. According to S. K. Kṣīrāsāgar this is the ‘mature work’ of Rājwāḍe, i. e., expresses his final opinion.

Ibid., p. 414.

⁵⁸ Rājwāḍe, *Mi āṇi Mājhe Kārya*, XVI, p. 388.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, XVII, p. 443.

⁶⁰ Rājwāḍe, *Nāsadiyasūktabhāṣya*, p. 196.

which had inspired the monotheistic reform movement. He realised that the way to the superman of Nietzsche required a sublimation of impulses and a high degree of self-discipline, that it was not merely based on a feeling of superiority; but he also felt himself encouraged by Nietzsche in his defence of the caste system and of an inferior position for woman.

Rājwāde again poses the perennial question of the relation between the finite and the infinite. His determination to find a solution which would preserve the value of created reality while remaining linked up with the philosophical tradition of India deserves recognition. It should be an invitation to search anew for a solution.

B. VĀMAN MALHĀR JOŚĪ :

CONFRONTATION WITH MODERNISM⁶¹

The seed which Āgarkar had sown permeated society irresistibly. The generation of educated people which grew up after his death did not escape the attraction of his Spencerian thought and had to rationalize its attitude to the new reform. By and large, the reformers were still regarded as innovators; but their ideas gained strength, so that one can speak of a movement, which became known as modernism. The new generation saw the growth of two influential political groups, the Moderates and the Nationalists, each with its distinct political and social ideology.

It was left to Vāman Malhār Jośī, who called himself a 'rationalist from among the group of Āgarkar',⁶² to become an interpreter of the new reform to the new generation. Like most of the earlier political, social and intellectual leaders of Mahārāṣṭra, he came from a Brāhmaṇ family. He was born in the Konkan

⁶¹ Modernism is the translation of the Marāṭhī word *navamatavāda* and is not taken in the same sense as that used by Western Christianity at the beginning of this century. The causes, however, which produced the *navamatavāda* were partly the same as those which produced modernism in Western Christianity.

⁶² V. M. Jośī, *Vicāra-Vihāra*, p. 126. The sentence first appeared in 'Mīṅṅi Navamatavāda', *Pratibhā*, February, 1936.